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This paper is motivated by the surprising rapid growth of new light-vehicle sales in Turkey in 2015.
Domestic sales grew 25%, dramatically surpassing the industry estimates of around 8%. Our approach
is to inform the sales trend estimate with the information obtained from the light-vehicle stock (the
number of cars and light trucks ofﬁcially registered in the country), and the scrappage data. More
speciﬁcally, we improve the sales trend estimate by estimating the trend of its stock. Using household
data, we show that an important reason for the rapid sales growth is that an increasing share of
household budgets is spent on automobile purchases. The elasticity of light-vehicle sales to cyclical
changes in aggregate demand is high and robust; its estimates are around 6 with a standard deviation
of about 0.5. The price elasticity of light-vehicle sales is estimated to be about 0.8, but the estimates
are imprecise and not robust. We estimate the trend level of light-vehicle sales to be roughly 7
percent of the existing stock. A remarkable out-of-sample forecast performance is obtained for ho-
rizons up to nearly a decade by a regression equation using only a cyclical gap measure, the time
trend and obvious policy dummies. Various speciﬁcations suggest that the strong 2015 growth of
light-vehicle sales was predictable in late 2014.
© 2016 Central Bank of The Republic of Turkey. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The motor vehicle sector is a signiﬁcant part of the Turkish
economy. It accounts for 6.6 percent of industrial production,
which corresponds to 40.3 percent of capital goods production.1
Considering its backward linkages to other sectors, its total in-
ﬂuence on the Turkish economy should be much higher. It is the
leading sector in Turkish exports. Automotive exports were 18.5
billion US dollars in 2015, which was 12.9 percent of all Turkish
exports in that year. From the demand side, automobile sales are
an important component of domestic demand, accounting for 4.5
percent of all expenditures and 38.3 percent of expenditures onhousehold expenditures and
errors belong to the authors.
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oduction Index (2010 ¼ 100)
urkey. Production and hosting bydurables by households.2 Turkey's position in the global motor
vehicle sector is not negligible. As of 2015, Turkey is the 15th
largest producer in the world and 5th largest producer in Europe.
Moreover, Turkey ranks 18th in the world and 6th in Europe in
total sales.
Our aim is to estimate a trend for the domestic sales of light
vehicles, i.e. automobiles plus light commercial vehicles, in Turkey.
This springs from our quest to understand the surprisingly large 25
percent growth rate of light-vehicle sales in Turkey during 2015, a
year in which there were doubts regarding how strong the pace of
macroeconomic activity was. Data from different sectors of the
economy were sending mixed signals, raising concerns whether
overall growthwas weakening or not.Meanwhile, each data release
for the light vehicles sales was suggesting that the demand was
strong. The time series data on new sales did not offer a clear pic-
ture as to where the unexpected strength of demand came from,
given that the economy grew 4.0 percent (a rate near its estimated2 According to the ofﬁcial weights in Consumer Price Index (2003 ¼ 100) pub-
lished by Turkstat for 2016.
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tightened.We examine the sales of light vehicles using an approach
similar to Greenspan and Cohen (1999) by looking at the progress
of the light-vehicle stock (the number of cars ofﬁcially registered in
the country) and scrapped vehicles separately and estimating their
trends. Greenspan and Cohen (1999) write that an important
advantage of this approach is that it does not require extensive
assumptions about the determinants of sales such as demographic
trends, the state of the economy, and consumer preferences. In the
Turkish case, other advantages are that the data for the stock of
light vehicles extend much farther back (1966 as opposed to
1993), and, more crucially, the trend in light-vehicle demand is
much clearer in the stock data than in sales data, even in the
overlapping shorter part of the sample.
There are two main approaches in the literature to analyze the
evolution of vehicle sales. The ﬁrst one is to use a macro perspective
and seek for the relationship between aggregate sales and associ-
ated macroeconomic indicators. Vehicles are treated as homoge-
neous products, whereas product heterogeneity, brand
differentiation, consumer preferences or vehicle characteristics are
not paid much attention in this approach. The alternative approach
has a micro perspective, paying more attention to consumer
choices, vehicle properties as well as market structure and hedonic
pricing. Those two approaches both have advantages and disad-
vantages. The macro approach is more convenient for macroeco-
nomic policy making purposes, viewing vehicles as durable
consumption goods and understanding the inﬂuence of macro-
economic indicators such as household income, prices, interest
rates, etc. on sales (Carlson, 1978; Levinsohn, 1988; Arguea et al.,
1994; McCarthy, 1996; Verboven, 1996).3 These studies in general
estimate the price elasticity of car sales to be below unity, whereas
some studies ﬁnd price elasticity little over unity. Income elastici-
ties are found to be around 2. On the other hand, the micro
perspective helps understand individual behavior/preferences in
car ownership (Brendemoen, 1994), making a better market anal-
ysis such as segment differentiation across cars (Bordley and
McDonald, 1993; Bordley, 2006) and investigating the impact of
sector speciﬁc policy changes easier such as tax exemptions or
scrappage programs (Fiuza, 2002; Cantos-Sanchez et al., 2015). This
study has a macro perspective as we deal with aggregate sales.
Consequently, vehicle properties and consumer choices are not
considered in our estimations. We nevertheless bring to bear some
facts from the Turkish household surveys and sales by brand in the
Turkish market to help understand the rapid growth of Turkish
demand for cars.
The studies on automobile demand in Turkey are scarce
compared to the extensive literature for other countries, especially
for the US. Among them, Alper and Mumcu (2007) ﬁnd that both
the country of origin as well as the quality of brands are important
for automobile demand in Turkey. Furthermore, the demand for
new automobiles is found to be price inelastic in the short run.
Yavas¸ et al. (2014) ﬁnd that equipment, design, motor size and fuel
type are the main criteria in deciding to buy a car. On the other
hand, €Ozçam and €Ozçam (2014) ﬁnd that the demand for auto-
mobiles is price elastic, and observe that it is strongly correlated
with the business cycle, with an informally estimated elasticity of 5
to 10with respect to cyclical GDP changes. Against this background,
to the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst in Turkey to
estimate the underlying trend in light-vehicle sales by examining
the progress of the light-vehicle stock and scrapped vehicles.3 See Kang and Lee (2014) for a summary of different studies on automobile
demand.Our results show thatwhile the growth trendof light-vehicle sales
isnotevident in itsowntimeseries, it isevident in the timeseriesof its
stock. After adding the estimated scrappage rate (0.84 percent of the
light-vehicle stock per year) to the growth rate of the projected tra-
jectoryof the light-vehicle stock,wearrive at a total annualnumberof
light-vehicle sales of roughly 7 percent of the existing stock (or 7.5
percent of the last year's stock) for the current cyclically adjusted level
of domestic demand. The ongoing increase in the household budget
shareof automobiles, the lownumberof registeredvehiclesper capita
compared to other countries, and also possibly the steadily growing
car leasing sector, are factors that support this estimated trend to
continue in the years ahead. Empirical analysis points out that the
demand gap calculated from the ﬁnal domestic demand explains
mostof thedeviationof sales fromitsgrowth trend.Other factors such
as real interest rate, fuel prices and automobile prices may provide
extra information depending on the sample period; however, their
relationships are not as robust as that of the demand gap. Finally, a
simple speciﬁcation (consisting of the vehicle stock's trend, output
gap, and a dummy variable controlling for the scrappage program of
2004) produces fairly good out-of-sample forecasts to follow the
underlying trend innewsales and identify theupsanddownsof light-
vehicle sales. Finally, we look at the ability of the wider set of speci-
ﬁcations that include additional variables to forecast the strong de-
mand of 2015 out of sample. We ﬁnd that the sales performance in
2015 should not be considered as a surprise and could have been
estimated with the information available at the end of 2014.
The study proceeds as follows: In the second and third sections,
we introduce the data and the methodology for estimating the
trend for light-vehicle sales. The fourth section elaborates on the
trend estimations. The ﬁfth section discusses potential factors
supporting the sales growth trend. The sixth section presents an
empirical analysis on the determinants of the deviation of sales
from the estimated trend and the out-of-sample forecasts of
various models. The last section concludes.
2. Data
The domestic sales data for light vehicles are taken from Auto-
mobile Distributors' Association (ADA) and are seasonally adjusted
by the authors. In the literature, the majority of the studies analyze
only the automobile sales. However, the degree of substitution for
the two components of light vehicles, i.e. automobiles and light
commercial vehicles, is very high in Turkey, and they behave
similarly except when a regulation that differentiates their
behavior from each other is introduced. The rate of sales tax is
substantially lower for light commercial vehicles than for auto-
mobiles, encouraging the substitution of light commercial vehicles
for automobiles in noncommercial usage. However, the regulations
affecting the tradeoff between the two categories change from time
to time, as, for example, in 2012, when a change took place in the
regulation for light commercial vehicle sales. That regulation
restricted the usage of light commercial vehicles for noncommer-
cial purposes and brought extra costs for acquiring these vehicles.
Subsequently, unlike previous periods, the two components' sales
pathsmoved in opposite directions and the composition of demand
has shifted in favor of automobiles immediately (Fig. 1a). When
those limitations were partially reduced at the beginning of 2014,
the two began to move in tandem again. Against this background,
taking light vehicles as the unit of analysis instead of decomposing
it into two is particularly important in the Turkish case. The time
series for the total light-vehicle sales is shown in Fig. 1b.
The light-vehicle stock data is taken from Turkish Statistical
Institute (Turkstat). The stock value for a speciﬁc period is the total
number of vehicles registered in the country as of the last day of
that period. The data is available in both monthly and annual
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Fig. 1. a. Automobile vs. light commercial vehicle sales in Turkey. b. Total light-vehicle sales in Turkey. Source: ADA, Authors’ own calculation.
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anomaly in 2004. Sales should generally be greater than the change
in the stock, because every year some vehicles are totaled in acci-
dents or scrapped, and are consequently removed from trafﬁc. The
left panel of Fig. 2 shows the sales data together with the change in
the stock as in the original annual frequency data. Sales are indeed
often greater than (or at least not noticeably less than) the change
in the stock, except in 2004 as seen in the left panel. Anomaly
disappears when the level implied by the corresponding monthly
data for 2004 is used instead, as shown in the right panel of Fig. 2.
The details are discussed in Appendix A.5 One could combine Fig. 3 with additional information on the cyclical situation
of the economy and try to make more informed deductions: For example, given that
1994 was a crisis year, which likely reduced both GDP and automobile sales but
reduced the latter more (because vehicles are income elastic durable goods), one
could discount the second panel and presume that the ﬁrst panel to be more
reliable. But, as we see below, that presumption would be incorrect.
6 Each series in Fig. 4b is also scaled to make the average of the 1993e1994
period equal 100. It would not have made a noticeable difference in Fig. 4b if the
base year was chosen instead as either 1993 or 1994.
7 To see the relationship between the trend of the stock and its corresponding
ﬂow variable, suppose the stock grows continuously over time at a constant rate of
gt3. The methodology to estimate the trend
Our aim is to understand how new light-vehicle sales progress
over time so that we can evaluate over/under performance of new
sales at a certain period by comparing to its trend. In doing so, we
follow a methodology that is not practiced much in the literature,
one exception being Greenspan and Cohen (1999), who estimate
car sales in the US by estimating the stock trend and the scrappage
rate separately. In this framework, the time path of the vehicle stock
provides an insight on new vehicle sales. An important advantage
of this approach is that it does not require extensive assumptions
about the determinants of sales such as demographics, the state of
the economy, and consumer preferences. Additional advantages in
the Turkish case are that the light-vehicle stock follows a particu-
larly smooth trend and dates back to an earlier period.
The stock of vehicles increases by the number of vehicles sold
and decreases by the number of vehicles that are retired due to
various reasons. Accordingly, the number of vehicles sold should be
equal to the sum of the change in the vehicle stock and the number
of scrapped vehicles (Equation (1)).4
Salest ¼ DStockt þ Scrapt (1)
This equation, of course, is an identity anddoes not implya causal
relationship, such as that scrappage causes new vehicle sales.
However, an exogenous shock like the introduction of scrappage
program may lead to an increase in new sales, as Greenspan and
Cohen (1999) notes and as observed in Turkey in 2004.4 Greenspan and Cohen (1999) decompose total scrap into two as engineering
scrap and cyclical scrap. We do not make such a distinction.Against this background, a trend for new sales can be estimated
by ﬁrst estimating the growth trend of the stock and adding to it an
allowance for retired vehicles. In this way, we can get a trajectory
for new sales and evaluate each year's sales performance in com-
parison with the growth rate of the trend. This would allow us to
understand if an unprecedented growth in sales rate, such as in
2015, is in fact surprising or not.4. Trend estimations
The high volatility of light-vehicle sales makes it difﬁcult to
identify the trend of its series. That trend is sensitive to the starting
point. As shown in Fig. 3a and b, which present two different
comparisons of GDP to domestic light-vehicle sales with different
initial points, whether light-vehicle sales have a faster or slower
trend than GDP is not clear from the sales data alone.5 Similarly,
rather than picking 1993 or 1994 as the base year, if we set the
average of 1993 and 1994 to 100, the emerging graph suggests that
the growth trend of new light-vehicle sales is close to that of GDP
(Fig. 4a).
In contrast, a steep upward trend is immediately apparent in
Fig. 4b below, which plots the stock of light vehicles together with
real GDP.6 This is important because the trend of the stock also
reveals the trend of sales.7 Over the period shown in Fig. 4b, the
stock of light vehicles grew at an average rate of 7.5% per year,
signiﬁcantly faster than the average GDP growth rate of 4.1% per
year.g, i.e., Kt ¼ Ae . Suppose that this stock variable depreciates at rate d. Then the ﬂow
variable that builds that stock, say St, would equal
_Kt  dKt ¼ Agegt  dAegt ¼ ðg  dÞAegt . Note that (g  d)A is a constant, and there-
fore the last equation means that the ﬂow variable St also grows at rate g. In other
words, the ﬂow variable has the same trend as its stock.
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Fig. 2. Total light-vehicle sales vs. change in light-vehicle stock (% of previous year's stock level). Source: ADA, TurkStat.
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The data for the light-vehicle stock start from 1966. We esti-
mate a quadratic trend for the logarithm of the light-vehicle stock
by regressing it on a constant, the year and the year squared, as
shown in Equation (2).
lnðStocktÞ ¼ aþ b0*t þ b1* t2 þ εt (2)
In Fig. 5, the ﬁtted exponential trend is shown together with the
stock of light vehicles. This ﬁgure shows that the stock of light
vehicles resembles quite well a smooth exponential growth trend
where the growth rate slowly declines over time in a linear fashion.
One possible caveat to Fig. 5 is that it goes too far back. In the 1980s
and the decades before that, the Turkish market for automobiles
was not a freely functioning market in terms of market access and
production. Turkey restricted international trade greatly and there
were also important restrictions on how ﬁnancial markets oper-
ated. Perhaps not surprisingly, the stock series differed much more
greatly from its trend in those early years than in the later period
(Fig. 6). It would be better to focus on the period since 1993, given
the irregular behavior of the stock series before 1993, and given
that the new sales series, which is the primary focus in this paper,
also starts in 1993.
Fig. 7 presents the replicated estimation of Equation (2) for the
period 1993e2015 and the uncertainty band around the esti-
mated path. As in the longer sample, the time series for the stock
resembles a smooth exponential trend, with the exception of the
deviation caused by the 2001 crisis. Note that the 2009 crisis did
not cause an equally sizeable deviation from that trend. The
leading reason is that the substantial reduction in special con-
sumption tax on automobiles and light commercial vehicles be-
tween March 2009 and October 2009 gave crucial support to
light-vehicle sales.8 In Decembers, sales tend to be nearly twice as high as the average month of that
year.
9 Another hypothetical explanation to why vehicles removed from trafﬁc can
become negative is that a notable number of autos might be transferred by their
owners from abroad and registered in Turkey, as, for example, allowed by the tax
exemptions offered to diplomatic workers, who work in missions abroad for two
years or more. Those workers are allowed to bring their automobiles from abroad
without having to pay sales taxesdwhich can be an important advantage. Note that
both of the years in which the series in Fig. 8 turns negative are years of cyclical
downturns that saw notable slowdowns in auto sales.4.2. Estimating the scrappage rate of light vehicles
New sales have to be greater than the change in the vehicle
stock by an amount that replaces retired vehicles, as noted earlier
(Equation (1)). That, indeed, is the case in Turkey, as shown in
Fig. 8, except for 1994 and 2008. That may appear like an error at
ﬁrst sight, because that series represents the number of scrapped
vehicles, which should normally be a nonnegative number.
However, the time inconsistency between the sales and the reg-
istrations may lead to such an outcome. As an example, a vehiclesold in December may be registered in January of the following
year to delay taxes or reduce fees. Since December is the most
active month for the market,8 the size of the postponed regis-
trations can become noticeable. Moreover, when the following
year is cyclically a downturn, the difference can easily become
negative.9
A reasonable avenue to proceed appears to be to rely on the
average of the series shown in Fig. 8. However, the series has a
sharp peak in 2004 associated with a scrappage program that
introduced tax deductions to incentivize the retirement (i.e.
scrappage) of old vehicles, resulting in an unusually large number
of vehicles removed from trafﬁc in 2004 (see Appendix A). That
large number should be left out of the average to prevent it from
distorting the calculated mean. Moreover, the series of removed
vehicles has tended to be lower after the 2004 peak. Possibly
because many vehicles were retired in 2004, there were fewer
vehicles to be retired in the following yearsdresulting in lower
rates of scrapped vehicles after 2004. To summarize, we would use
the post-2004 average of that series, which equals 0.84% of the
previous year's stock, to be the value currently representative of the
difference between sales and the change in the stock of light
vehicles.
Note that 0.84% is a relatively low value for the rate of scrap-
page, considering that the annual rate of depreciation for auto-
mobiles is estimated to be 15 percent or even higher by different
studies (Peles, 1988; Jorgenson, 1996; Storchmann, 2004). Scrap-
page is of course different from depreciation. A car is not scrapped
when it has depreciated parts; rather, the dysfunctional parts are
replaced and the car is put back in trafﬁc. The scrappage rate can
therefore be expected to be substantially below the depreciation
rate. Nevertheless, 0.84% is still too low, when compared to the
rate in the US, hovering around 8% in the 1950s (Fig. 9). The higher
scrappage rates in the past (especially before the 1980s) might be
due to the replacement of the “gas guzzler” models of the 1970s
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U. Demiroglu, Ç. Yüncüler / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 93e108 97by more efﬁcient cars.10 The scrappage rate in the US has fallen to
around 5% in the 2000s, which is still about 6 times the average in
the post-2004 period in Turkey.
One possibility is that 0.84% might be an erroneous statistic, as a
result of, for example, behavior such as households holding back
from scrapping their dysfunctional old automobiles with the
anticipation of a new scrappage program that would make those10 A high rate of replacement would not be evident in the Turkish data in that
period because the number of cars from that era has been very modest in Turkey in
the sample period, i.e., after 1993.cars valuable for tax deduction purposes. However, such imperfec-
tions in the data would not matter for the purpose of this paper. As
long as that behavior continues, 0.84% would be a good estimate of
the difference between the sales trend and the stock's growth trend.
In fact, 0.84% should not be assumed to be an erroneous statistic
for the scrappage rate itself. There are good reasons why the
scrappage rate in Turkey should be much lower than in the US. A
leading one is that the Turkish light-vehicle stock is much younger.
The cars that are scrapped are typically the old ones, and the stock
of old cars in Turkey is very small in size. Appendix B shows that the
scrappage rate would be 2.65%, about three times as high, if the
automobile market had reached a steady state in Turkey. In other
words, the freshness of the Turkish stock explains why a mature
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Fig. 9. Scrappage rate in the United States.
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higher scrappage rate.
Another explanation may be the difference in the sales tax
structure of the country. The sales tax rates on automobiles are
very high in Turkey, currently ranging from 71% to 271% of the
pre-tax price of automobiles.11,12 In contrast, that value is very low
in the US.13 Moreover, the book value of a scrapped car could be
deducted until recent years from taxes in the US, and can still be
deducted albeit at a narrower extent than in the past. Finally,
ordinary Balassa Samuelson thinking suggests that the price of
nontradables relative to tradables is lower in developing coun-
tries. Consistent with this and the labor-intensive nature of auto
repair, maintenance is far less costly in Turkey than in the US. All
of those result in much greater incentive in Turkey than in the
United States for maintaining a light vehicle and keeping it in
trafﬁc rather than scrapping it. Income level and the fuel prices
are other potential determinants of scrappage rate, as put forth
in the literature (Hamilton and Macauley, 1996; Greenspan
and Cohen, 1999; Eskeland and Feyzioglu, 1997; Kahn, 1986;11 The numbers reﬂect the combined burden of special sales tax and value added
tax on automobiles. The lower value is for the automobiles with a motor size of
1600 cc or lower, while higher value is for those having a motor size above 2000 cc.
The total sales tax is 36% for light commercial vehicles, 35 percentage points less
than the lowest tax rate for automobiles.
12 Repair and maintenance of cars also have a sales tax in Turkey but its rate is
much lower than that on new vehicles and is much less difﬁcult to evade.
13 Each state has a different taxation policy. However, sales taxes are known to
range between 0 and 11 across states.Jacobsen and van Benthem, 2015). When fuel price rises, people
become more willing to keep their car's technology updated
especially if their income level is suitable for doing that.
4.3. Estimating the new sales trend for light vehicles
The sales trend is obtained by calculating the ﬁrst difference of
the stock trend shown in Fig. 7 and adding to it the 0.84% average
scrappage rate from Fig. 8. Fig. 10a below shows that inferred sales
trend together with actual sales data as a fraction of the prior year's
stock. The uncertainty band is similarly calculated by taking the
ﬁrst difference of the band in Fig. 7 and adding 0.84% of the average
scrappage rate. Fig. 10a shows that the trend level of sales currently
is 7.5 percent of the previous year's stock, or, equivalently, roughly 7
percent of the existing stock.
To highlight the beneﬁt of obtaining the trend from the stock
series, Fig. 10b shows what happens to the ﬁgure when the sales
trend is estimated directly from its own time series. The volatile
nature of the sales series makes it difﬁcult to estimate that trend
with precision, resulting in a wider uncertainty band. Note that the
estimated trend line has also a more rapid downward slope. The
reason for that is the unusually high sales of automobiles in 1993.
The trend obtained from the stock series in Fig. 10a makes it clear
that the 1993 sales were an outlier. In contrast, sales series starts in
1993, which obscures the fact that 1993 sales were too far above
normal.14 Interestingly, additional information about the cyclical
situation in those years would not help in determining that 1993 is14 The reason for the strong 1993 sales appears to have to do with stock catching
up to its trend, i.e., a case of “pent-up demand”.
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Fig. 10. The trend estimate of light-vehicle sales (% previous year's stock). Source: TurkStat, ADA, Authors’ own calculations.
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Fig. 11. The trend estimate of light-vehicle sales (millions). Source: TurkStat, ADA, Authors’ own calculations.
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Fig. 12. The share of automobile spending in total household expenditure (%). Source:
Turkstat Household Budget Survey, Authors’ own calculation
15 That ﬁgure is obtained as follows: (9.4/2.9)1/10 ¼ 1.125.
U. Demiroglu, Ç. Yüncüler / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 93e108 99an outlier, because 1994 was a crisis year (and a severe one) while
1993 was not. Cyclical considerations would have (incorrectly)
suggested that 1994 is a low sales point and 1993 is the more
normal level, which is not the case. Finally, Fig. 11 shows the same
series in levels (number of vehicles). The large size of the uncer-
tainty band when the trend is estimated from the sales series is
more apparent in Fig. 11b.
As mentioned earlier, the number of light vehicles sold reached
in 2015 a historical high and was 30,000 shy of the 1 million
threshold, corresponding to 25 percent growth relative to 2014.
What does the analysis so far tell about the strong sales perfor-
mance in 2015? Looking at the ﬁgures, a plot of the sales series as a
fraction of the stock makes it clear that the 2015 sales were not
abnormally high, but were fully consistent with the trend of the
Turkish automobile market. The 2015 increase appears to be more
of a case of catching up with the trend than a temporary jump due
to cyclical or other reasons. For 2016, a sales performance between
0.93 and 1.13 million light vehicles would lie within the 95% con-
ﬁdence interval. The mid-point is 1.03 million. That ﬁgure implies a
growth rate of around 6 percent for the underlying trend growth in
light-vehicle sales.
5. Factors supporting light-vehicle sales growth trend
5.1. Household expenditures
Turkstat's Household Budget Survey contains information on
the share of automobile purchases in total household expenditures.As shown in Fig. 12, total spending on auto purchases as a share of
total household expenditures have increased signiﬁcantly from
2.9% in 2003 to 9.4% in 2013. In other words, the share of autos in
household budgets increased at an average rate of 12.5% over that
period.15 Assuming that total household spending increases
roughly at the same rate as GDP over that ten-year period, (nomi-
nal) spending on automobiles must have roughly increased 12.5
percentage points faster than (nominal) GDP.
Fig. 13. Average annual automobile sales growth by brand (%, from 2004 to 2014). Source: Turkstat, Authors’ own calculation.
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1.%20 2.%20 3.%20 4.%20 5.%20
Fig. 14. Household spending on auto purchases by income quintiles (% of household expenditures). Source: Turkstat Household Budget Survey, Authors’ own calculation.
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more rapid increase than is evident in Fig. 4b. According to Fig. 4b,
the number of light vehicles stock in Turkey grew at a rate of 7.0%d
only 3.2 percentage points faster than real GDP, which grew at a
rate of 3.8% per year over that period. That difference, 3.2 per-
centage points, is much more modest than the 12.5 percentage
points suggested by the household spending data. Therefore
Figs. 4b and 12 might be suggesting very different trends, but there
are good explanations for this, as explained next.16
A leading possible explanation is that the 7.0% growth rate in
Fig. 4b. is for the number of vehicles while Fig. 12 is for the share in
spending, and the average vehicle might have become more
expensive over time. Any change over time in the composition of
vehicles toward more expensive brands would make the growth
rate of spending on automobiles exceed the growth rate of the
number of units. That has indeed been the case. Data are available
from Turkstat on the number of automobiles sold domestically by
brand in the period 2004 to 2014. The average growth rates of sales
for different brands are shown in Fig. 13. The combined number of
sales of BMWandMercedes, the highest premium brands for which
data are separately available, grew 18 percent per year on average
over that decade, while Volvo and Audi sales grew 15 percent and16 One reason could be that the time period in Fig. 4b is different, but it is not. The
average annual auto demand growth rate in Fig. 4b is 7.2% for the 2003e2013
period, slightly above 7.0% (the value for the full 1993e2015 period in Fig. 3).Volkswagen sales grew 10 percent per year. In contrast, the com-
bined sum of all other brands in Fig. 13 grew at the modest rate of
0.7 percent per year. In short, the number of units of premium
brands sold has increased dramatically, while that of modest
brands stayed relatively ﬂat. This ﬁnding is consistent with that of
Bordley and McDonald (1993), who argue that, the more luxurious
a car is, the higher is its income elasticity.
What may be the reason for the increase in the budget share
of automobiles? Fig. 14 shows the distribution of budget share of
automobile purchases across different income quintiles. The
higher the income level, the higher is the budget share of auto
purchases. Moreover, the budget share has shown a tendency to
increase in each income group. While it might appear from Fig. 12
that the budget share might have saturated in the last few years
of the sample, Fig. 14 reveals that this is not the case. It shows
that the higher the household's income is, the greater is the
fraction of income that the household would spend on auto
purchases.5.2. Per capita car ownership
The light-vehicle stock has grown rapidly in Turkey since 1993.
As of 2015, it is 4.6 times its level in 1993. Nevertheless, the number
of vehicles per capita is still very low compared to many countries
in the world (Fig. 15). As shown by many studies in the literature
(Dargay, 2001; Dargay and Gately, 1999), income is one of the most
Fig. 15. The number of passenger cars per thousand people in European countries. Source: Eurostat.
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Fig. 16. Estimated vehicle park of the operational leasing sector.
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Fig. 17. Number of purchased vehicles by operational leasing sector.
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Fig. 18. Share of operational leasing purchases in total automobile sales. * As of June
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Fig. 19. Contract features of operational leasing sector (term based, percent of all
contracts).
17 We compare the purchases only to automobile sales because the ﬁrms are not
allowed to lease light commercial vehicles to their customers by law.
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capita income is still less than the developed countries, which have
higher per capita vehicle numbers. Wu et al. (2014) and Rota et al.
(2016) show that, the relationship between per capita income and
the vehicle per capita has an S shaped relationship. Thus, there is a
saturation point inherent to the nature of the demand in the car
market. The response of car demand to income is higher at low
levels of per-capita number of cars than at levels that are close to
the saturation level (Rota et al., 2016). IMF (2005) estimates that the
saturation point is approximately 850 vehicles per 1000 people,
while Rota et al. (2016) ﬁts a Gombertz curve and estimates a joint
saturation level of 622 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants based on data
from 59 countries. Against this background, the rise in per capita
income and the low number of vehicles per capita compared to
developed countries hints at a prolonged time for strong sales
growth in Turkey.5.3. Operational leasing ﬁrms
The demand for new cars does not originate only from house-
holds. The operational leasing ﬁrms are also one of the main actors
in the market. According to the TOKKDER (2016), the vehicle stock
of the sector has reached to almost 300,000 as of June 2016 from
105,000 vehicles in 2009 (Fig. 16). The sector has a much more
signiﬁcant presence in new sales. Figs. 17 and 18 show the number
of vehicles purchased by the sector and its share on total automo-
bile sales.17 The purchase numbers are increasing rapidly and, as of
2016, the sector's share has risen up to 20.2 percent of all sales. The
level of the purchases is 7th highest in Europe.
Compared to the stock, the sales ﬁgures are fairly high. The
reason is that the leasing companies do not lease the same car to
another customer after the contract ends and sells it in the sec-
ondary market. The distribution of term-based contracts shows
that 90 percent of the leased cars have a contract less than 3.5 years
(Fig. 19). Thus, the renewal rate each year is very high. Although the
sector has a high share in new vehicle sales, most of those units are
put on the secondary market in a short time, and consequently the
sector commands a small share of the overall automobile stock.
Moreover, leased cars are likely to displace private ownership of
automobiles to some extent. Nevertheless, the displacement of
private ownership is likely to be signiﬁcantly below the full number
of leased cars; one reason is that there are important tax advan-
tages to leasing. Therefore, the growth of this sector would likely
result in some increase in the overall stock of vehicles.
The extent the private ﬁrms lease cars is still far beyond the
saturated markets in Europe (Çakmak, 2015). Accordingly, the
sector is expected to grow for a long period of time. Thus, the
steadily increasing activity of the operational leasing sector and
their renewal policy in Turkey may be considered to be another
reason for the continued increases in demand for new light-vehicle
sales in the future.6. A regression analysis to estimate elasticities and produce
out-of-sample forecasts
As a ﬁnal step, we try to test empirically which factors play a role
on the deviations of sales from the estimated stock trend. To this
end, we run the regression shown in Equation (3). The left hand
side variable is quarterly sales of light vehicles normalized by
dividing by the estimated trend of the capital stock, K*. As
explanatory variables, we include the most probable
Table 1
Estimation results for the period 1994Q1 e 2015Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.004895***
(5.89)
0.004898***
(6.74)
0.006249***
(7.11)
0.00633***
(7.14)
0.006233***
(5.93)
Trend 0.000008
(0.73)
0.000009
(0.99)
0.0000365**
(2.49)
0.0000374**
(2.54)
0.0000344**
(1.79)
Gap 0.001099***
(10.76)
0.001183***
(13.05)
0.001169***
(13.25)
0.00119***
(12.85)
0.001212***
(12.12)
ln(price_auto/CPI) 0.01558**
(2.13)
0.015143**
(2.06)
0.012318
(1.20)
ln(price_fuel/CPI) 0.002441
(0.77)
0.002963
(0.87)
Auto_Annual Inﬂation (+4) 3.73E-05
(0.48)
Dummy_Tax 0.003345***
(5.02)
0.008388***
(4.82)
0.008573***
(4.87)
0.008732***
(4.81)
Dummy_Scrap 0.008962*
(1.97)
0.00344**
(2.10)
0.003509**
(2.13)
0.003603**
(2.14)
Obs. 88 88 88 88 84
R2 0.574 0.683 0.698 0.700 0.704
Adjusted R2 0.564 0.668 0.680 0.678 0.677
DurbineWatson 1.827 1.964 2.097 2.095 2.103
Notes: *,**,*** show signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%,1%, respectively. t-statistics are in parantheses. The estimates are obtained after correcting for autocorrelation.
Table 2
Estimation results for the 2002Q1 e 2015Q4 sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.006007***
(3.00)
0.004931***
(3.02)
0.006681***
(3.45)
0.007487***
(3.98)
0.007141***
(3.81)
0.008783***
(4.38)
Trend 0.000019
(0.8)
0.000010
(0.5)
0.000041
(1.55)
0.0000487*
(1.9)
0.000036
(1.34)
0.000043
(1.62)
Gap 0.000794***
(4.89)
0.001021***
(7.54)
0.000999***
(7.46)
0.001045***
(8.07)
0.001006***
(7.70)
0.000908***
(6.66)
ln(price_auto/CPI) 0.015324
(1.62)
0.017562*
(1.93)
0.006538
(0.56)
0.00153
(0.12)
ln(price_fuel/CPI) 0.014036**
(2.33)
0.011501*
(1.86)
0.010527*
(1.75)
Auto_Annual Inﬂation (+4) 0.000141
(1.45)
0.000175*
(1.83)
Interest rate 0.000258*
(1.95)
Dummy_Tax 0.00839***
(5.21)
0.007802***
(4.80)
0.007264***
(4.62)
0.007425***
(4.77)
0.007921***
(5.17)
Dummy_Scrap 0.003255**
(2.14)
0.00328**
(2.19)
0.002635
(1.81)
0.002871*
(1.98)
0.002775*
(1.98)
Obs. 56 56 56 56 56 52
R2 0.335 0.596 0.618 0.658 0.674 0.700
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.563 0.577 0.614 0.623 0.645
DurbinWatson 1.789 1.929 1.977 2.083 2.164 2.077
Notes: *,**,*** show signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%,1%, respectively. t-statistics are in parantheses. The estimates are obtained after correcting for autocorrelation.
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the “demand gap” instead of the output gap, which uses ﬁnal do-
mestic demand rather than GDP, in order to account for demand
conditions in the economy. The demand gap is obtained by esti-
mating the trend of ﬁnal domestic demand by a HP ﬁlter and then
by taking the difference of ﬁnal domestic demand from that trend.
The demand gap is conceptually more appropriate for the purpose
of this paper and also works better in the regressions than the
output gap. Another explanatory variable that we use is the price
index for automobiles divided by the consumer price index (CPI).
Similarly, another explanatory variable is obtained by dividing fuel
prices to CPI. We use real interest rate for the auto loans. Finally we
add the annual future increase in car prices (simply next year's car
price inﬂation) to test the tendency of consumers to demand cars18 We tried different time spans for the future path of car prices, however the
most explanatory one is found to be the four quarter ahead prices.when a price increase is expected.18 This is motivated by the
anecdotal conjecture that consumers may sometimes be antici-
pating upcoming increases in automobile prices and consequently
deciding to buy earlier rather than later. We expect that the de-
mand gap and future price movements to increase current demand
for automobiles, and expect the other determinants to reduce it.
The data source of all price indicators and the ﬁnal domestic de-
mand measure is Turkstat. The interest rate data is retrieved from
the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey. Price
data are seasonally adjusted by the authors.
Besides economic indicators, we use two dummy variables. The
ﬁrst one is the scrappage dummy, which takes the value of 1 be-
tween 2003Q2 and 2004Q4, when the government instituted a
scrappage program to promote automobile sales. The second
dummy takes the value of 1 during the period from 2009Q1 to
2009Q4, when government applied temporary tax reductions for
light vehicles to mitigate the adverse effects of the 2008 global
ﬁnancial crisis on the Turkish economy. Those dummy variables
EFig. 20. Out-of-sample forecasts for various horizons.
U. Demiroglu, Ç. Yüncüler / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 93e108104represent the events over the sample period that have had a non-
negligible impact on sales and are therefore useful to include in
the regression in order to prevent them from distorting the rela-
tionship between vehicle sales and the other variables.
Salest
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
(3)
Our sample covers the period 1994Q1-2005Q4, except for the
interest rate, which is available for this analysis starting only from
2002Q1. Thus, we ﬁrst run regressions excluding the interest ratefor the whole sample, and then we re-estimate the full set of re-
gressions for the period 2002Q1 and 2015Q4.
6.1. Estimation results
The ﬁrst part of this subsection presents the regression results
and the second part compares the out-of-sample forecast perfor-
mances of various speciﬁcations.
6.1.1. Regression results for 1994Q1 e 2015Q4
We start with an elementary speciﬁcation consisting of a gap
variable in addition to a constant and the trend, which are the
strongest predictors of auto demand, and successively add other
explanatory variables. As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 1, the
gap variable is statistically very signiﬁcant. As the second step, we
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Note: See the note in Figure 20. This figure is the same as the upper leŌ panel of Figure 20 
except that the forecast is augmented with the esƟmated impact of a temporary but major
reducƟon in automobile sales taxes introduced in 2009. That impact esƟmate is obtained 
from the regression equaƟon in Table 1 column (2). 
Fig. 21. Out-of-sample performance for 2007 after correcting for the effect of 2009 tax
reduction.
U. Demiroglu, Ç. Yüncüler / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 93e108 105add price variable for the automobiles. The real price of automobiles
is also found statistically signiﬁcant and has the expected negative
sign in all but the last of the speciﬁcations. We then add the relative
price of fuel, but it does not seem to provide extra information. The
last variable, next year's annual inﬂation of automobile prices,
which is used as a proxy for expected increases in automobile prices,
is also insigniﬁcant. Considering the signiﬁcance of coefﬁcient es-
timates, third speciﬁcation in Table 1 has the best performance.0
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Fig. 22. Out-of-sample performance of various sThe elasticity of sales with respect to those determinants can
also be computed from those estimates. A one percentage point
decrease (increase) in the demand gap lowers (raises) sales by
around 6 percent. The relative price elasticity of light vehicle de-
mand is around 0.8 percent, i.e., slightly inelastic. This ﬁnding is in
line with the ﬁndings of other studies for other countries.
As mentioned before, we cannot add the interest rate variable to
the regression utilizing the longest sample period. We therefore
limit our attention to the shorter sample that begins from 2002Q1
and repeat the same exercise but this time also including the in-
terest rate. As shown in the last column of Table 2, the speciﬁcation
that includes all the explanatory variables ﬁnd all variables signif-
icant at 10 percent or less except for automobile prices. (The latter
ceases to be signiﬁcant in the shorter sampledit is signiﬁcant only
in one of the speciﬁcations and only at 10 percent.) The elasticity of
sales to the demand gap is also slightly lower in Table 2daround
5dbut is still strongly signiﬁcant. The elasticity of sales with
respect to the real interest rate is around 1.5, but is not estimated
precisely due to low signiﬁcance. All coefﬁcients have the expected
sign.
6.2. Out-of-sample forecast evaluation
In the previous section, estimation results of various speciﬁca-
tions for both sample periods have shown that the demand gap is
the most signiﬁcant as well as the most robust variable in
explaining light-vehicle sales. Against this background, it would be
a good starting point to check the out-of-sample performance of
the demand gap in forecasting light-vehicle sales. Fig. 20 presents
the out-of-sample forecasts for various horizons. Those forecasts
show that the speciﬁcation with the demand gap alone performs4 06 08 10 12 14
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peciﬁcations for light-vehicle sales in 2015.
Fig. A.1. Removed vehicles, direct and indirect measures (% of previous year's stock).
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which throws out the last 9 years of data before estimating the
stock trend K* and the regression coefﬁcients, is able to track not
only the underlying trend of sales in the remaining 9 years, but also
the cyclical ups and downs.
Note that ﬁrst two out-of-sample forecasts (OSF_2007 and
OSF_2009) may appear to have failed to forecast 2009dthe out-
of-sample forecasts predict a sharp drop in sales in 2009 that did
not occur. This is because of a large temporary reduction in light-
vehicle sales tax in 2009 that substantially stimulated the sales,
making the actual realization of sales higher than what it other-
wise would be. That policy reduced the Special Consumption Tax
(a type of value added tax), which lowered automobile prices and
prevented a deep slump in sales in 2009. When the out-of-
sample forecast is corrected with the estimated impact of that
policy, the forecast tracks actual sales also in 2009, as shown in
Fig. 21. The difference between Fig. 21 and the upper-left panel of
Fig. 20 sheds light on the effectiveness of the tax reduction policy
in 2009. Given the dynamics of the pre-crisis period, the demand
conditions could have led to a big slump in light-vehicle sales
similar to that in the 2001 crisis if that policy action was not
taken.
Fig. 22 presents the out-of-sample forecasts for 2015 of all
speciﬁcations in Tables 1 and 2 above, obtained by using the in-
formation until 2014Q4. The upper panel of Fig. 22 uses the spec-
iﬁcations in Table 1 and the lower panel uses those in Table 2. In the
upper panel, the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations, which are the most
parsimonious among all and contain only the demand gap variable,
edge their competitors by giving closer estimates to the realized
sales. For the shorter sample period (the lower panel), the situation
is different: speciﬁcation 6 containing all possible explanatory
variables performs the best. That speciﬁcation also has the smallest
forecast error among all speciﬁcations, both Tables 1 and 2, based
on the root mean squared error criterion. Speciﬁcations 4 and 1 in
the shorter sample period provide the second and third best fore-
cast performances, respectively.
As a ﬁnal remark, the models provide very close forecasts for the
2015 total sales ﬁgure evenwhen they fail to trackwell the quarterly
time path of 2015 sales. The best performer, i.e. the sixth speciﬁca-
tion in the shorter sample, has a forecast error for the 2015 total as
low as 0.53 percent. The second and third best performers also
provide forecast errors of 1.3 and 2.2 percent, respectively. Given the
25 percent growth in light-vehicle sales in 2015, these forecasts can
be considered quite successful, compared to for example the in-
dustry forecasts even at the beginning of 2015 that were quoted in
business news articles as around 8 percent. That result suggests that
the 2015 surge in light-vehicle sales perhaps should not have been a
big surprise.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we aim to estimate an important demand
component in the Turkish economy, automobile sales, from the
data on its stock and the number of scrapped vehicles. Our interest
has sprung from the strong 25 percent annual increase in light-
vehicle sales during 2015, which was thought to have been not
supported by macroeconomic fundamentals. Our approach in
analyzing the issue is similar to Greenspan and Cohen (1999), who
approximate sales in the US by estimating the change in the vehicle
stock and the scrappage rate.
Our analyses show that the light-vehicle stock follows a strik-
ingly smooth trend and the annual scrappage rate is on average
around 0.84 percent of the light-vehicle stock. Those imply that a
total annual sales ﬁgure of around 7 percent of the existing vehicle
stock can be considered a normal trend level. Empiricalestimations indicate that deviations from this estimated trajectory
can be mostly explained by the demand gap. The relative price of
automobiles, interest rates and relative price of fuel are also found
to be statistically signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations with the cor-
rect sign, but their signiﬁcance levels are not robust. The esti-
mated price elasticity is about 0.8, which is similar to ﬁndings in
the literature, but, again, that estimate is not robust. The rapid
growth of the vehicle stock is expected to continue in the years
ahead as households continue to spend an increasing share of
their income on vehicle purchases. As income in the Turkish
economy continues to rise, automobile demand will continue to
rise. The per capita income developments and the low level of
registered vehicles per capita in comparison to developed coun-
tries conﬁrm that there is still much room for such growth. Finally,
the continued rise in the activity of operational leasing ﬁrms may
prove to be another important factor to add dynamism to new
vehicle sales. Finally, out-of-sample forecasts of various models
suggest that the high level of light-vehicle sales in 2015 was
predictable with the information available at the end of 2014. The
out-of-sample forecast performance of the basic speciﬁcation,
which has sales as a fraction of the estimated capital stock trend
on the left hand side and includes only a cyclical gap variable and
dummy variables to control for some major policy programs in the
automotive sector (in addition to a constant and a trend), is fairly
successful in terms of tracking the future trend as well as the
movements around that trend at horizons as long as nearly a
decade.Appendix A. The anomaly in the light-vehicle stock series in
2004
The monthly and annual data for light-vehicle sales show an
inconsistency in 2004. That year might be special perhaps because
of a scrappage programda tax deduction offered to buyers of new
vehicles if they scrap their old onesdintroduced in mid-2003
aiming to stimulate auto sales, which stayed in force through the
end of 2004. The annual stock data may have continued to include
vehicles that were actually retired in 2004 under that policy.We are
not aware of the exact reason why the annual and monthly data
differ in 2004. But the ﬁgure implied by the monthly data for 2004
appears to be more plausible than that implied by the annual data:
Sales should generally be greater than the change in the stock
because of retired or totaled vehicles, and they indeed tend to be so
in both panels of Fig. 2, but not for 2004 in Fig. 2a. In other words,
the data point for 2004 in Fig. 2a is an anomaly. That problem does
not exist in Fig. 2b, which plots the one derived from the monthly
data. Consequently, we opt to rely on the monthly data for the level
of stocks in year 2004 in the regression analysis and out-of-sample
forecasts.
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measure of the vehicles that are retired from trafﬁc in a givenperiod.
The difference of the series shown in each panel of Fig. 2 produces
one suchmeasuredFig. 2a produces one for the annual data and 2. b
for the monthly data. Each of those measures can be compared to a
line item available in the monthly data entitled vehicles removed
from registration, which attempts to measure retired vehicles
directly. Fig. A.1 above compares that direct measure with the two
alternative indirect measures obtained from Fig. 2. We see from
Fig. A.1 that the indirect measure obtained from the monthly data
(from Fig. 2b) ismore consistentwith the directmeasure in the data.
As a separate concern, the above-mentioned line item for
removed vehicles itself presents a puzzle itself. It indicates too few
retired vehicles in the years before 2003 (not shown in Fig. A.1).
This paper will not be concerned either with this puzzle or with the
question of whether the ﬁx for the year 2004 provides a more ac-
curate stock series or not, because the purpose of this paper is not
constructing a good series for the auto stock. The purpose here is to
try to make use of the available stock data to understand and es-
timate the trend in sales, and the foregoing ﬁx appears to serve that
purpose well.
Appendix B. The rate of removal of vehicles from the light-
vehicle stock
Fig. B.1 shows the distribution of the light-vehicle stocks in 2014
by model year. The initial point is an exception, because it is the
sum of all vehicles whose models are 1983 or before. The accu-
mulation of that series from 1983 onwards shows howmany of the
vehicles withmodel year t or earlier has survived until 2014. Fig. B.2
compares it with the level of stock as of year t. These two series can
be used to calculate the survival rate for each year's light-vehicle
stock since 1983.Fig. B.1. Stock of light vehicles by vintage year. (Number of vehicles, in millions).
Fig. B.2. Stock as of year t and the stock that survived until year 2014. (Number of
vehicles, in millions).The calculated survival rate is shown in Fig. B.3.19 Note that the
survival rate falls by age not linearly but in an increasing manner,
consistent with the idea that the scrappage probability should be
rising in parallel to the vehicle's age. We explore what kind of
depreciation structuremight generate such a survival rate proﬁle.We
consider threedifferentpossibilities forhowthe scrappage ratemight
increase by age: in a linear, quadratic or cubic fashion. Given a certain
scrappage rate proﬁle, and given the time series for the light-vehicle
stock tracing back to 1966, one can start from 1966 (when the auto
stock was less than 1% of its current size) and, under the innocuous
assumption that the initial year's stockwas produced in that year, can
calculate how much of each year's stock was carried over from pre-
vious years and how much of it was produced in that year. Each
depreciationproﬁle impliesasurvival rateproﬁle for theTurkish light-
vehicle stock, and the depreciation rate with the least mean square
error is chosen for each of the three functional forms. The quadratic
functional form provides a more desirable ﬁt and the resulting
scrappage rate is shown in Fig. B.4, while the ﬁtted survival rate is
shown in Fig. B.5 together with the survival rate implied by the data.Fig. B.3. Survival rate implied by Fig. B.2 (% of the stock level).The estimated scrappage rate is very low initially and reaches
only 1% by age 15 of the vehicles, reaching 1.6% by age 20 and 3.5%
by age 30, albeit increasing more rapidly and reaching almost 10%
by age 50. The estimated scrappage proﬁle implies that overall
scrappage rate is 0.84% for the current overall stock of light vehicles
(the same estimate in the text obtained from the difference be-
tween the sales and the change in the stock of light vehicles).
That estimated scrappage proﬁle can be used to explore the
source of the low scrappage rate in Turkey. More speciﬁcally, the
relatively young age of the overall Turkish vehicle stock is one
reason why the overall scrappage rate is low in Turkey. The contri-
bution of that factor can be estimated based on the estimated
scrappage proﬁle. If the automobilemarketwas not rapidly growing
(as it were in Turkey in the sample period) but instead was in a
steady state where sales were constant over time, the age proﬁle
would exactly have the same shape as the survival proﬁle shown in
Fig. B.3. When the estimated depreciation proﬁle is applied to that
hypothetical age proﬁle, the overall scrappage rate (as a fraction of
the existing stock) rises from 0.84% to 2.65%. The scrappage rate of
2.65% is still low relative to the rate in US,which has been around 5%
recently, as shown in Fig. 9. However, there are other reasons for that
rate to be higher in the US, as discussed in the text.19 It should be noted that the distribution of the current stock by the model year is
provided by Turkstat. The time series for the stock of vehicles is not by model year
but by registration year. The sale of vehicles for a model year used to start in the last
half of the previous year and would largely be registered in that calendar year. That
convention was changed in 2012. The mismatch between the model year and the
registration year of vehicles may be one of the reasons why the survival rate proﬁle
is not very smooth.
Fig. B.5. The estimated survival rate and the ﬁt with the survival rate implied by the
data. (%).
Fig. B.4. Estimated depreciation rate based on the survival proﬁle of the auto shown in
Fig. B.3. (%).
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